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The Economics of Hacking 
 
Abstract 
Hacking is becoming more common and dangerous. The challenge of dealing with 
hacking often comes from the fact that much of our wisdom about conventional crime 
cannot be directly applied to understand hacking behavior.  
Against this backdrop, this essay reviews hacking studies, with a focus on discussing 
the new features of cybercrime and how they affect the application of classical 
economic theory of crime in the cyberspace.  Most findings of hacking studies can be 
interpreted with a parsimonious demand and supply framework. Hackers decide 
whether and how much to “supply” hacking by calculating the return on hacking over 
other opportunities. Defenders optimally tolerate some level of hacking risks because 
defense is costly. This tolerance can be interpreted as an indirect “demand” for hacking. 
Variations in law enforcement, hacking benefits, hacking costs, legal alternatives, 
private defense, and the dual use problem can variously affect the supply or demand for 
hacking, and in turn the equilibrium observation of hacking in the market. Overall, this 
essay suggests that the classical economic theory of crime remains a powerful 
framework to explain hacking behaviors. However, the application of this theory calls 
for considerations of different assumptions and driving forces, such as psychological 
motives and economies of scale in offenses, that are often less prevalent in conventional 
(offline) criminal behaviors, but that tend to underscore hacking in the cyberspace. 
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As businesses and consumers increasingly digitize their transactions and activities, 
hacking of computing and data resources has become common and dangerous, creating 
even larger economic impacts than many conventional crimes (Kshetri 2006). Hacking 
encompasses many unique characteristics, making it more challenging to tackle than 
many conventional crimes in the physical world.  
This essay advances and analyzes several key features, including law enforcement, 
hacking benefits and costs, legal alternatives, private defense, and the dual use nature, 
that set hacking apart from other conventional crimes, and that call for more focused 
research and development. The analysis extends classical economic theories of crime, 
viz., the market model of crime (Ehrlich 1996; Freeman 1999), to the cyberspace. It 
illustrates how such market regulation of hacking provides a powerful framework to 
understand and predict hacking prominence in view of the unique assumptions and 
driving forces, such as psychological motives and scale economies in offenses, that are 
often less prevalent in conventional (offline) criminal behaviors, but that tend to 
underscore hacking in the cyberspace. 
Because this essay focuses exclusively on economic factors affecting hacking choices, 
it does not review studies that: (1) Do not involve hackers. For example, research about 
user misbehavior in organizations or security vulnerabilities due to under-investment 
of protection is not included in this review. (2) Do not focus on hacking behavior. For 
example, research about exchanges in illicit markets or underground communities, or 
that assumes exogenous hacking threats, is not included. (3) Do not focus on economic 
factors and analysis. For example, research emphasizing sociological or psychological 
theories, or hacking technology, is not included.  
Furthermore, this essay covers general hacking activities but not selected hacking types 
or techniques. Readers interested in particular hacking types can refer to, for example, 
Cartwright, Castro, and Cartwright (2019) for ransomware, Rao and Reiley (2012) for 
spam, Ramzan (2010) for phishing, and Leontiadis, Moore, and Christin (2014) for 
search-engine poisoning. 
The Market Model of Hacking 
Consider a hacking “market” with three types of actors: Hackers, defenders, and the 
government. Hackers obtain benefits by attacking some digital assets, for example, by 
breaching a bank’s database and using the stolen credit card data for illicit purchases. 
Defenders and the government want to protect the digital assets from hackers’ attacks. 
The government imposes ex post punishment against hacking. Defenders take ex ante 
precautions (Katyal 2001). The term “cybercrime” is used to refer to malicious hacking 
throughout this essay. 
A convenient starting point to analyze the interaction between hackers, defenders, and 
the government is the so-called “market model of crime” (Ehrlich 1996; Freeman 1999), 
which interprets criminal activities as a “product”. The familiar supply and demand 
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framework in economics can then be used to study the equilibrium levels of 
cybercrimes in the market. 
Cybercrime Supply 
The classic model of criminal offense (Becker 1968) offers a practical way to model 
the supply of cybercrime. The model considers individual’s choice between criminal 
activities and legal activities based on expected utility.  
Specifically, let 𝑈𝑐1 denote the hacker’s utility of committing the cybercrime, which 
captures the expected illegitimate benefit from the offense net of any costs incurred in 
acquiring such benefit. Let 𝑈𝑐2 denote the hacker’s utility of committing cybercrime 
but getting apprehended and punished. In addition to the benefit and direct costs of 
committing the offense, 𝑈𝑐2  is related to the severity of criminal sanction upon 
apprehension. In general, we expect 𝑈𝑐1 > 𝑈𝑐2  because criminal sanction should 
decrease hackers’ utility. Let 𝑈𝑛𝑐 denote the hacker’s utility of abstaining from crime, 
which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of cybercrimes. 
Let 𝑝 be the probability of apprehension and conviction, which is related to the strength 
of law enforcement. As a rational decision maker, the hacker will commit a cybercrime 
if and only if its benefit from committing the offense exceeds its cost. Mathematically, 
this condition can be expressed as 
 (1 − 𝑝)𝑈𝑐1 + 𝑝𝑈𝑐2 > 𝑈𝑛𝑐.   (1)  
The left-hand side of Equation (1) is the hacker’s expected utility from committing the 
cybercrime. This expected utility is increasing in 𝑈𝑐1 and 𝑈𝑐2 and decreasing in 𝑝 when 𝑈𝑐1 > 𝑈𝑐2, which is generally the case. Equation (1) is more likely to be satisfied when 
the right-hand side, 𝑈𝑛𝑐, is small. Realistically, hackers are more likely to commit an 
offense if the opportunity cost of cybercrime is low (for example, when they are jobless 
and so have more time to spend on hacking).   
By Equation (1), a hacker is more likely to commit cybercrime when the return on 
cybercrime, (1 − 𝑝)𝑈𝑐1 + 𝑝𝑈𝑐2, increases. If we plot the return on cybercrime against 
the amount of cybercrime that hackers are willing to commit, we obtain an upward-
slopping “supply” curve. Figure 1 shows an illustrative supply curve, SS. In Figure 1, 
the horizontal axis, Q, represents the amount (“quantity” in a conventional supply curve) 
of cybercrime. The vertical axis, P, represents utility gained (“price” in a conventional 
supply curve) by the hacker from committing the offense. 
Cybercrime Demand 
It is less straightforward to define the “demand” for cybercrime. In principle, no people 
or organization would desire crime, but everyone has a certain degree of tolerance for 
crimes because, realistically, defending against crimes is costly (Mukhopadhyay et al. 
2013). This is especially the case for cybercrimes, the defense of which requires 
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substantial domain knowledge and effort. For example, it is impractical for a company 
to constantly monitor how its employees handle phishing emails. Most companies 
would conduct some training sessions and then let employees tackle phishing emails on 
their own, leaving a possibility (“tolerating”) that some employees may inadvertently 
respond to and get cheated by a phishing email.  
Similar to conventional crime economics theories (e.g., Ehrlich 1996; Freeman 1999), 
the tolerance of cybercrime is interpreted as cybercrime “demand”. The term “demand” 
does not imply defenders desire cybercrimes; instead, it merely reflects the situation 
where defenders have to tolerate some cybercrimes because it is practically infeasible, 
or too costly, for them to eliminate all cybercrimes.  
In conventional markets, price serves as a wealth transfer instrument that regulates the 
exchange of goods and services. In the case of cybercrimes, wealth is moved between 
the defender and the hacker. For example, when a hacker breaches into a company’s 
server to steal customer information, the company suffers a loss in terms of reputation 
damage, customer redress and compensation, or fines payable to regulatory agencies. 
The hacker can benefit from fame, selling valuable customer information such as credit 
card data, or directly using the data for fraudulent behaviors or exploitations, such as 
email scams or business process compromises. 
If hacking increases the defender’s loss of wealth, the defenders’ tolerance (“demand”) 
for cybercrime decreases and they will have a greater incentive to reduce the loss by 
spending more on protection, such as deploying more resources to detect and prevent 
intrusion, conducting security audits to reduce system bugs, or cybersecurity awareness 
training. Therefore, if we plot the loss of wealth due to cybercrime against the amount 
of cybercrime that the defender is willing to tolerate, we obtain a downward-slopping 
“demand” curve. Figure 1 shows an illustrative demand curve, DD. 
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Figure 1. The market model of hacking  
Empirically, the demand curve can be approximated by surveying companies about 
their willingness to spend resources in protecting themselves at different hypothetical 
loss levels due to hacking. Estimating the supply curve is more challenging as it is often 
difficult to identify hackers. Nevertheless, it can be approximated by polling the hacker 
community (e.g., active participants in online hacker forums) about their inclination to 
commit cybercrimes against different levels of returns. Statistical techniques such as 
randomized survey responses (e.g., Warner 1965; Kwan, So and Tam 2010) could be 
used to elicit truthful answers on sensitive topics such as hacking. 
In any case, the market model of hacking provides a convenient and intuitive theoretical 
tool to analyze potential factors relevant to hacking. More importantly, it helps assess 
how hacking and cybercrime could be influenced in a predictable direction. 
Market Equilibrium 
The demand curve and supply curve in Figure 1 together determine the equilibrium 
amount of cybercrime and return on/wealth loss due to cybercrime (Q and P in Figure 
1). Consider, for example, when the expected wealth gain from a cybercrime exceeds 
the equilibrium level. Hackers would supply more cybercrimes than what defenders 
would tolerate. Defenders would then step up the protection to reduce their wealth loss. 
This would continue until the wealth lossin cybercrime and level of cybercrime return 
to the equilibrium level. Similarly, if the wealth loss is lower than the equilibrium level, 
then defenders would tolerate more cybercrimes than what hackers would supply. 
Defenders would spend less in protection to save costs. This would make the system 
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less secure, which raises the potential return on cybercrime. The supply and demand of 
cybercrime would again return to the equilibrium level because of the “regulation” of 
the return/wealth loss arising from the cybercrime. 
Note that this stylistic equilibrium analysis categorically groups hackers into one single 
entity and defenders into another single entity. Realistically, hackers vary in terms of 
demographics and hacking interests. Defenders may comprise firms, customers, and 
security service providers. The “hackers” and “defenders” above need not refer to a 
single actor; instead, they are abstract entities that facilitate systematic analysis of how 
the choices of each of these hackers and defenders affect the equilibrium observation 
of cybercrimes in the market.  
Separating the consideration of cybercrime demand and supply allows us to illustrate 
how changes in external factors affect the equilibrium cybercrime level. For example, 
consider a costless cyber insurance that covers part of the loss in a data breach (e.g. 
Böhme and Schwartz 2010; Bandyopadhyay and Mookerjee 2019). Because defenders’ 
loss from cybercrime is reduced due to the cyber insurance’s compensation, defenders 
will tolerate more cybercrimes at any levels of wealth losses. This implies the cyber 
insurance will shift the demand curve to the right (i.e., it makes defenders more 
tolerating of hacking because the hacking impact is smaller). The new equilibrium level 
of cybercrime will become 𝑄′ in Figure 2. Importantly, this “demand shift” will also 
increase the return on cybercrime from 𝑃 to 𝑃′ in the equilibrium. 
 
Figure 2. Demand curve shift due to a costless cyber insurance 
Similarly, consider what happens when the returns from other (non-hacking) activities 
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become more attractive. Less cybercrimes will be provided at any return levels because 
some “would-be” hackers will now change to perform these non-hacking activities 
instead of hacking. The supply curve will be shifted to the left. The new equilibrium 
crime level will become 𝑄″ as shown in Figure 3.  
Interestingly, the equilibrium return on cybercrime will also increase from 𝑃 to 𝑃″. This 
is because, in the presence of more attractive substitute activities, only those hackers 
who expect higher returns from cybercrimes will continue to hack. Hackers who expect 
lower returns from cybercrimes will quit and spend their time on substitute activities 
that give them higher returns than hacking. As a result, cybercrimes with low expected 
returns will not be performed, leading to an increase in the observed cybercrime return 
level in the equilibrium.  
 
Figure 3. Supply curve shift due to more attractive legal jobs  
Factors Shaping Cybercrime Provision 
The supply and demand framework provides a convenient tool to analyze the factors 
shaping cybercrimes. By variously influencing supply and demand, these factors affect 
the equilibrium cybercrime levels through regulating hacking returns. Note that most 
of the factors affecting cybercrimes are contained in classical crime theories too (e.g., 
Becker 1968; Stigler 1970). However, different emphases and analysis are needed to 
articulate their significance in the cybercrime setting. Hence, the remainder of this essay 
focuses on the unique characteristics and influences of these factors. 
Law Enforcement: Deterrence’s Difficulty 
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We start from the celebrated economics of crime literature, which analyzes how law 
enforcement affects crime choices. There are two broad strands in this literature. The 
first focuses on normative analyses of the optimal enforcement of law, in particular, 
four policy choices – sanctioning rule, form of sanction, magnitude of sanction, and 
probability of detection (Polinsky and Shavell 2007). The second strand, the positivist 
analyses, focuses on assessing the responsiveness of crimes to sentencing (Chalfin and 
McCrary 2017; Freeman 1999). In general, the lesson from this strand of research is 
that increasing either the severity or certainty of punishment deters criminals. 
The cyberspace is a novel regime that challenges the traditional justice system in terms 
of identification, investigation, and prosecution. One major challenge is that many 
cybercrime victims do not report their security breaches or incidents to legal authorities 
(Kshetri 2006; Police Executive Research Forum 2018). One reason for such under-
reporting is that they could be unaware of the victimization because modern computer 
viruses, trojans, or malicious spyware are designed to secretly take control of the 
victims’ systems for other mischievous actions, such as to form part of a botnet or, lately, 
to mine Bitcoin. The victims often do not have enough expertise to detect security 
compromises. Organizational victims, on the other hand, often intentionally under-
report because they fear the victimization may affect customers’ and stakeholders’ 
impression of their ability and, in turn, their reputation. The head of the U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s Cyber Division estimated that only about 10 percent of all 
security incidents were reported (Police Executive Research Forum 2014). 
Even when legal authorities receive security incident reports, formidable challenges 
exist in collecting the evidence for criminal proceedings. Obtaining the electronic trails 
of a cybercrime often requires adequately-trained and equipped investigators, who are 
not readily available in the legal system. In addition, to enhance the quality of evidence, 
investigators must trace the original sources of communications to connect the hackers 
and cybercriminals with real persons in the physical world. This is challenging as the 
anonymity and complexity of Internet communications allow cybercriminals to easily 
disguise and hide themselves from law enforcement agencies. 
Challenges also exist in prosecution and criminal sanctions. Law enforcement tends to 
prioritize crimes according to offense severity. In most cases, the loss needs to exceed 
certain thresholds or be significant enough before investigation would start (e.g., Police 
Executive Research Forum 2014; Cárdenas et al. 2009). But cybercrimes often 
encompass multiple small or low-impact victims (Moore, Clayton, and Anderson 2009). 
Furthermore, the global nature of cybercrimes means a sophisticated offender can 
operate from locations outside the jurisdictions proscribing her/his activities. Territorial 
boundaries and differences in legal systems bring severe operational challenges in 
apprehending and prosecuting international cybercriminals. 
These challenges limit the deterrence effect of law enforcement against cybercrimes, 
which is consistent with prior empirical studies. For example, the U.S. congress passed 
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the Controlling the Assault of non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 
(CAN-SPAM Act) in 2003. This law criminalizes spamming and imposes penalties on 
violations. Despite the claim made by the U.S. FTC that the volume of spam had 
decreased and begun to level off (Majoras et al. 2005), research on the effectiveness of 
the CAN-SPAM Act is at most inconclusive (e.g., Kigerl 2016; Lee 2005; Grimes 2007). 
Similarly, Png, Wang, and Wang (2008) find limited evidence to support domestic law 
enforcement can deter attacks within the country. Hackers simply displace the crimes 
to other locations. In particular, the U.S. cybercrime law may have caused hackers to 
initiate attacks from other countries instead of the U.S. 
Referring to the supply and demand framework, effective law enforcement increases 
hackers’ risks of committing cybercrimes. By equation (1), it would decrease 𝑈𝑐2 , 
making the crime less attractive. Ceteris paribus, it should shift the supply curve 
leftward, causing the equilibrium crime level to decrease. If, however, the law cannot 
be effectively enforced due to challenges in identification, investigation, and 
prosecution, then 𝑈𝑐2 would increase, which would shift the supply curve to the right. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of deterrence through law enforcement would shape the 
equilibrium level of cybercrime and the return on cybercrime by distorting the supply, 
viz. hackers’ incentives to hack.  
As one example, in the context of Convention on Cybercrime, Hui, Kim, and Wang 
(2017) find that international cooperation reduces distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks, a popular cyber-attack in which hackers try to overload systems by flooding 
the systems with superfluous requests, by at least 11.8 percent. A similar effect does not 
exist if the participating countries make a reservation on international cooperation, 
meaning when they are less committed in assisting each other in global enforcement, 
which would inevitably make cybercrimes more attractive to hackers. 
Note that law enforcement can also affect defenders’ behaviors, leading to an impact 
on equilibrium crime level via demand-side considerations. For example, Romanosky, 
Telang, and Acquisti (2011) find that data breach disclosure law helps reduce identity 
thefts by an average of 6.1 percent. Referring to Figure 1, mandating disclosure of 
security breaches would shift the demand curve leftward because defenders will tolerate 
less cybercrimes in view of the potential reputation damage due to security breach 
disclosure. The shift of the demand curve leftward would lead to both lower cybercrime 
level and a smaller return on cybercrime. 
Benefits of Hacking: Financial vs. Non-Financial gains 
Uncovering hackers’ motivation is instrumental to understanding their behaviors. In 
particular, why would they choose to hack in the first place? The classical theory of 
crime assumes we can summarize the benefits or losses associated with criminal 
activities by some monetary terms (see, e.g., Becker 1968). It can be used to effectively 
model criminal behaviors when the criminals are motivated financially or by other 
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material benefits, as in the case of most conventional crimes such as burglary or robbery. 
However, ample self-reported evidence suggests that hackers can be psychologically 
motivated. For example, Schell and Dodge (2002) surveyed more than 200 hackers, 
among whom 36 percent said they hack to “advance network, software, and computer 
capabilities,” 34 percent claimed “to solve puzzles or challenges,” and 8 percent said to 
“expose weakness in organizations or in their products.” By contrast, only 4 percent of 
the surveyed hackers indicated their primary motivation to be “make money.” Other 
studies suggest hackers may hack for curiosity, fun (e.g., Turgeman-Goldschmidt 2005; 
Xu, Hu, and Zhang 2013), retaliation, espionage, learning (e.g., Barber 2001), ideology 
(e.g., Coleman 2012; Jordan and Taylor 2004), demonstrating skills (e.g., Coleman and 
Golub 2008), and fame (e.g., Thomas 2002; Taylor 2012). 
The prior literature does not provide systematic guidance on how to analyze or predict 
criminal behaviors when criminals seek psychological benefits, which can be the case 
for hackers. For example, because of the economies of learning and specialization, 
hackers should focus on selected victims in every crime to leverage their experiences 
and expertise, just as a mugger familiar with robbing banks is more likely to rob a bank 
in his next crime. Empirical evidence has shown that hackers tend to seek variety, i.e., 
they prefer to attack victims in different regions using different hacking methods across 
attacks (Ooi et al. 2012). Such behavior is difficult to rationalize if hackers are purely 
profit-driven, but can be better explained if they are assumed to have a psychological 
desire or preference for variety seeking. 
Among the psychological motivations, fame and peer recognition are often among the 
most prominent factors (e.g., Thomas 2002; Taylor 2012). Leeson and Coyne (2005) 
provide an example to formalize the analysis of fame-driven hacker behaviors. They 
suggest that the attacks generated by fame-driven hackers depend on the interactions 
between a supply force and a demand force. The supply of attacks from fame-driven 
hackers is determined by the cost of hacking and the number of hackers who desire 
fame in the underground hacker community. The demand for attacks is determined by 
the hacking community’s reaction, which specifies how the community responds to 
different hacking quantities with fame. For example, one may expect more hacking is 
recognized with more notoriety and less hacking with less notoriety. 
Notwithstanding the existence of non-financial hacking incentives, the market model 
of hacking presented in Figure 1 can help analyze the impact of non-financial incentives. 
Such non-financial incentives should shift the supply curve to the right because, being 
motivated non-financially, hackers would commit more cybercrimes at every level of 
return. Due to the right shift of the supply curve, the equilibrium level of expected 
return/wealth loss would decrease whereas the equilibrium level of cybercrime would 
increase. This seems consistent with the anecdotal observation that many cyber-attacks 
feature a high volume of attacks, but the nature of the offense is often minor, not causing 
overly-significant disruption or losses to the defenders. 
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Costs of Hacking: Economies vs. Diseconomies of Scale 
Cybercrime is highly scalable. A physical bank robber may be able to hit one or two 
banks in a week. Cyber-attacks, such as computer viruses, worms, phishing, or 
ransomware, can target 1,000 if not 10,000 or even more devices at once.  
Png and Wang (2009) use two analytical models to formalize the differences between 
one-to-many attacks, known as mass attacks or opportunistic attacks, and other (more 
conventional) one-to-one attacks, known as targeted attacks. In mass attacks, such as 
phishing scam or ransomware attacks, the effort exerted by a hacker applies to a big 
group of users. Attacking more targets does not add much cost to the hacker due to 
economies of scale, as such mass attacks usually exhibit low or even negligible 
marginal costs. By contrast, in targeted attacks, such as DDoS attacks or system 
intrusions, the effort exerted by a hacker applies to a particular victim. The marginal 
cost of attack against each additional victim would increase because the attack is more 
customized, meaning the total cost of attack increases with the number of targets. 
Attacking more targeted victims also increases the probability of apprehension (Fultz 
and Grossklags 2009) because each of these targeted, customized attacks may leave 
footprints for law enforcement agencies to track the hackers. Therefore, targeteds 
attacks often exhibit diseconomies of scale. 
The difference in cost structure may affect how hackers choose targets. Ransbotham 
and Mitra (2009) review the postings from Usenet groups and find that three broad 
dimensions of target attractiveness, viz. being tangible and iconic and having reprisal 
value, are key hacker considerations in targeted attacks. By contrast, in mass attacks, 
hackers do not need to pre-select victims but are motivated to find a large number of 
targets. Hence, the likelihood of a particular firm becoming a target increases with the 
so-called “passive Internet presence,” i.e., the number and functionality of Internet 
connections, and the volume and richness of Internet activities. 
In general, the economies of scale associated with low or negligible marginal costs tend 
to shift the supply curve rightward. This should be the case for cyber-attacks, especially 
mass attacks, as well. Referring to equation (1), the low marginal cost of attacks tends 
to increase 𝑈𝑐1 and 𝑈𝑐2, which makes attacking more preferred. Given the expected 
gain from each victim, a hacker committing a mass attack would obtain a higher total 
net benefit. Therefore, s/he will be motivated to commit more cybercrimes. Referring 
to Figure 1, the right-shift of the supply curve implies the mass attack market will have 
more cybercrimes with a lower equilibrium wealth loss for each attack. This does seem 
to be the case for mass attacks such as phishing scams and ransomware attacks. 
Another way to model hackers’ costs is to allow for a fixed cost of exploiting a new 
vulnerability (e.g., cognition and opportunity costs). In this setting, Allodi, Massacci, 
and Williams (2017) study how hackers make temporal choices of vulnerabilities. Mass 
attackers may exploit only one vulnerability per software version and be slow in 
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introducing new vulnerabilities into their arsenals. Empirically, this theory can explain 
the heavy-tail distributions of some exploited vulnerabilities (Mukhopadhyay et al. 
2019). In particular, 5% of exploited vulnerabilities is responsible for about 95% of the 
attacks in some software (Allodi 2015). 
Finally, some studies have evaluated hackers’ responses to interventions that raise the 
cost of hacking. Theoretically, a higher cost of hacking shifts the supply curve leftward, 
and so it should reduce cybercrimes. Empirical findings support this prediction. For 
example, Brunt, Pandey, and McCoy (2017) find attacks launched through DDoS-for-
hire services reduced after a payment intervention requiring buyers to use Bitcoin for 
the transactions. The cost of attacks could have risen due to the difficulty in purchasing 
Bitcoins and the threat associated with Bitcoin storage and use. In the illegal market, 
McCoy et al. (2012) report how interrupting sellers’ payment networks, which raises 
sellers’ monetization costs, can be effective in suppressing such illegal businesses by 
causing, for example, reduction of illegal products sales, pursuit of riskier payment 
mechanisms, and drops in consumer conversion (in terms of people initiating but not 
eventually completing a transaction).  
Legal Alternatives: White Collar vs. Marginal Jobs 
The classical theory as outlined in the market model of hacking assumes offenders 
choose whether to commit a criminal act by weighing its benefits against the benefits 
from alternative activities. An increase in the pay from alternative activities increases 
the offenders’ opportunity cost, and so should reduce the probability of them to commit 
the criminal act. A large empirical literature has examined how unemployment, wage, 
job training, and other career developments affect crimes in conventional markets (see 
Chalfin and McCrary 2017 for a detailed review). 
According to this theory, how much potential offenders respond to the attractiveness of 
alternative opportunities depends on their earnings potential in the legal markets 
(Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001). Conventional crimes and cybercrimes are 
committed by distinct social groups whose earnings potential in the legal markets are 
likely to be different. Most conventional crimes are committed by marginal members 
of the society, who are often disproportionately drawn from groups with low incomes 
and poor employment prospects. By contrast, people with comparative advantages at 
cybercrimes tend to be educated and capable, but they may live in societies with poor 
job prospects or ineffective law enforcement. The literature refers to crimes committed 
by a person of respect and high social status as “white collar crimes” (Posner 1979). 
Because of the demographic differences between conventional criminals and hackers, 
marginal jobs that constitute attractive opportunities for conventional criminals may not 
attract hackers. Referring to equation (1), increasing the attractiveness of legal 
alternatives would increase 𝑈𝑛𝑐 . This should shift the supply curve of cybercrime 
leftward. At each level of the return on cybercrime, fewer hackers would be willing to 
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commit cybercrimes. But the extent of the shift should depend on the type of legal 
alternatives. For example, white collar jobs might have a greater effect on this shift than 
marginal jobs because they fit hackers’ demographic profiles better. Similarly, jobs 
opportunities in information technology-related sectors might have a greater effect on 
this shift than jobs opportunities in other (“blue collar”) sectors. 
Few studies have examined the connection between legal labor market conditions and 
cybercrimes. Empirical works such as Png, Wang, and Wang (2008) and Garg, Camp, 
and Kanich (2013) document a significant impact of labor market conditions on 
cybercrimes. However, these studies suffer two limitations. First, their empirical data 
allow them to identify only the origins of attacks but not the hackers. It is well known 
that cyber-attacks often come from computers under control by hackers from other 
geographical locations. Second, most of these research findings point to correlations, 
not causal relationships. 
Private Defense: Positive vs. Negative Spillover 
So far the discussion has been focusing on supply-side factors that influence hacking. 
This section turns to the role of private defense, which is related to defenders’ tolerance, 
or “demand”, for cybercrimes. The term “private defense” refers to defenders’ actions 
to protect themselves and avoid crime victimization (cf. government or law 
enforcement actions to protect the general public). 
Research on private defense in conventional crime settings is scant. The available 
studies are primarily interested in two questions. One is whether private protection 
deters criminals (Ayres and Levitt 1998; Cook and MacDonald 2011). The other is how 
private defense of one party affects the security of other parties, a phenomenon 
commonly called “spillover effect” in economics (Kunreuther and Heal 2003). The 
evidence suggests certain private defense measures, such as installing stolen vehicle 
tracking systems (Ayres and Levitt 1998) or establishing business improvement 
districts that strengthens local safeguards (Cook and MacDonald 2011), can help deter 
crimes. Also, there exists positive spillover effects in that the use of these defense 
measures benefit all defenders, including those not using them, because they increase 
the uncertainty of committing the crimes. However, we do not know if these findings 
would hold for other private defense measures (Chalfin and McCrary 2017). 
The spillover effect also exists in the cyberspace. In particular, cybercrime studies have 
argued, theoretically, that the direction of spillover critically depends on the technology 
that relates individual efforts to the outcomes (Varian 2004). The direction of spillover 
will in turn affect hackers’ strategies (Fultz and Grossklags 2009). In a “sum of effort” 
scenario, such as an attack that tries to slow down the distributed transfer of a file on a 
peer-to-peer network, there is a positive spillover effect. Adding more users will make 
the system more reliable and safer. Florêncio and Herley (2013) argue this is the key 
reason why many individuals in a large network are not attacked even when they have 
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poor security. By contrast, in a “weakest link” scenario, such as a hacker trying to 
breach a closed network by locating a vulnerable computer, there is a negative spillover. 
Adding more users will make the system less secure from attacks. 
In general, the socially-optimal level of private defense should be set at a level where 
the marginal benefit of protection equals the marginal cost of protection. The spillover 
effect, however, is often ignored by individuals. Hence, an individual’s equilibrium 
choice of private defense may not align with the true cost or benefit of that private 
defense for the society. In other words, the omission of spillover effects may lead to 
either too much or too little defense, implying market inefficiency. 
Although spillover effects could lead to too much (when more users bring more benefits, 
as in the case of the “sum of effort” configuration) or too little (when more users bring 
negative spillover, as in the case of the “weakest link” configuration) protection, two 
other types of market failure unambiguously lead to too little protection. One is 
misaligned incentives. For example, companies usually do not have incentives to 
protect customer data in full as they do not bear the full costs of a data breach (e.g., Lee 
et al. 2013; Hui et al. 2019). Another market failure arises from information asymmetry, 
also known as the “lemon problem” (Akerlof 1970). For instance, in the software 
market, customers have no reason to pay for more secure software as most of them 
cannot evaluate the software’s security. Hence, software vendors do not have incentives 
to invest in more security. These two types of market failures predict insufficient 
protection, which provides greater incentives for hackers to commit cybercrimes. For a 
thorough discussion of these market failures, see Anderson and Moore (2006). 
Empirically, the first-order question is whether private defense deters cybercrimes. 
Nagle, Ransbotham, and Westerman (2017) analyze the data from 480 Fortune 500 
enterprises and find that the number of open ports in a firm is associated with higher 
incidents of botnet activities, potential exploitations, and unsolicited communications, 
providing direct evidence that private defense (exhibited by the number of open ports 
in an enterprise) does affect the risks of cyber-attacks. 
However, care should be taken in concluding that private defense always leads to less 
cybercrimes. As a counter example, Miller and Tucker (2011) find that using encryption 
to protect customer data increases (instead of decreases) the risk of data breach in the 
healthcare sector. This surprising result is driven by an increase in employee 
dishonesty- and carelessness-driven security breaches. The encryption seems to be a 
substitute of the employees’ self-precaution. Similarly, in evaluating the security effects 
of meaningful-use attestation, a U.S. certification mechanism that fosters patient data 
protection, Kwon and Johnson (2018) find that although attested hospitals observe 
fewer data breaches in the short term, the number of data breaches does not decrease in 
the long-term. They suggest this attestation only helps hospitals establish policies and 
procedures to combat known attacks, but may impede quick responses and exploratory 
activities that address evolving security threats to the extent that it can be bad for the 
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hospitals’ security. They also find this substitution effect exists between regulatory 
pressure and proactive security investments.  Overall, these findings suggest one needs 
to consider the interactions between different defense measures before concluding 
whether certain private defense will lead to less cybercrimes (Hui et al. 2012). 
Other empirical works have compared the deterrence effects of different security 
practices. Ransbotham (2010) compares the security of open source software and closed 
source software. He finds open source software vulnerabilities are at greater risk of 
exploitation, diffuse more rapidly, and attract greater volumes of exploitation attempts. 
Vasek, Wadleigh, and Moore (2015) find that using content management systems (CMS) 
with higher market shares increases the risk of web-server compromise, probably 
because such CMS become a more attractive target for miscreants. Surprisingly, they 
find that this conclusion also applies to different versions of the same software – popular 
software versions tend to be targeted more often than less popular versions even though 
the popular versions are newer and up-to-date. These findings offer practical insights 
on how defenders can make better choices among different defense measures. 
The Dual Use Problem 
Dual use refers to the setting where an activity has both positive and negative uses 
(Katyal 2001). Forbidding the activity itself would forfeit its good purpose. A well-
known example of dual use technology in the conventional crime literature is the 
availability of guns (for a detailed review, see Lott 2013). On the positive side, allowing 
citizens to carry guns should have a deterrence effect that raises the expected risks and 
costs of criminal activities. On the negative side, legalizing guns would increase the 
likelihood that any particular dispute turns into a gun battle. 
Because dual use activities affect both the supply and demand of crimes and could 
generate positive and negative consequences, their net impact is largely an empirical 
question. Many policy choices that intervene in the creation, use, storage, access, and 
communication and dissemination of cybercrime-related information face this “dual 
use” problem. 
For example, one well-known controversial topic is vulnerability disclosure. On the one 
hand, disclosing vulnerability enables users to take precautions that can prevent or 
reduce security risks. On the other hand, hackers may make use of such information to 
attack users before users install any protection measures. Overall, Arora, Nandkumar, 
and Telang (2006) find that hackers exploit patched vulnerabilities (disclosure and 
patched) more than secret vulnerabilities (without disclosure). They most often exploit 
published vulnerabilities without patches. 
This finding suggests hackers get information from vulnerability disclosure and patch 
releases, and so vulnerability information needs to be disseminated carefully. To give 
an advantage to security professionals, two other vulnerability disclosure mechanisms 
have been proposed. One is the so-called “limited disclosure”. In this mechanism, some 
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vulnerability infomediaries, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), 
iDefense, and Tipping Point, control the timing of vulnerability disclosure. Typically, 
these infomediaries will accept vulnerability reports from vulnerability identifiers 
(could be ordinary software users or security researchers). However, after receiving 
vulnerability reports, they immediately inform only the affected software vendors and 
wait for appropriate safeguards to be put in place before making the vulnerability 
information public. Mitra and Ransbotham (2015) find that, compared with limited 
disclosure, full disclosure (making the vulnerability public immediately) expedites the 
onset of attacks against a vulnerability, increases the penetration of attacks among target 
systems, increases the risk of first attacks, and shifts the volume of attacks 
corresponding to a vulnerability to an earlier stage in its life cycle. Therefore, limited 
disclosure provides practical advantages to benign security professionals. 
The other mechanism is to create a “vulnerability market”, which provides security 
professionals with monetary rewards for reporting vulnerabilities. The vulnerability 
market provides an advantage to the “protection side” by increasing the incentives for 
benign security professionals to report vulnerabilities. Compared with nonmarket 
disclosure, Ransbotham, Mitra, and Ramsey (2012) demonstrate that market-based 
disclosure provides security advantages, for it restricts the diffusion of vulnerability 
exploitation, reduces the risk of exploitation, and decreases the volume of exploitation 
attempts. 
Another example of the dual use problem is the dissemination of hacking knowledge. 
On the one hand, discussion about hacking techniques exposes more people to hacking 
and helps like-minded hackers collaborate on cyber-attacks, which may promote 
aggression. On the other hand, such discussion can help develop and spread protection 
knowledge, which may help curb cyber-attacks. Using the data from hackforums.net, 
one of the largest hacking technology forums, Yue, Wang, and Hui (2019) find that a 
one percent increase in DDoS attack discussion decreases DDoS attacks by 0.032% to 
0.122%. This finding suggests that, surprisingly, allowing hacking discussion actually 
helps reduce cybercrimes. 
The last dual use example is the hacker group. Though most existing studies regard 
hackers as offensive and defenders as defensive, realistically hackers’ knowledge and 
techniques about attacks can be used to protect the systems (Moore and Anderson 2012). 
At the national security level, Moore, Friedman, and Procaccia (2010) find that when 
two parties can either stockpile vulnerabilities for offensive advantages or share 
vulnerabilities to secure the systems, the offensive behavior is likely to emerge 
endogenously, even though defensive behavior is more preferred.  
At the micro level, dual use hackers may open new possibilities for reducing 
cybercrimes when hackers are appropriately incentivized.  One noteworthy practice that 
leverages dual use hackers is the bug bounty program, which has been pursued by many 
large organizations, including Google, Facebook, Tencent, and even the US Department 
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of Defense. In bug bounty programs, hackers will be given monetary reward, namely 
“bug bounty”, for reporting “bugs” in organizations’ systems. Zhou and Hui (2019) 
study the impact of bug bounty programs. Their analysis shows that using bug bounty 
programs to divert hackers from exploitation provides economic (and sometimes 
security) advantages over using only self-defense and law enforcement. Until now, the 
dual use feature of hackers is relatively less explored in the traditional crime and even 
the cybercrime) literature. Future research should explicate its potential and examine 
its practical and policy implications in tackling hacking and cybercrimes. 
Conclusions 
This review analyzes hacking behaviors using a conventional demand and supply 
framework. It synthesizes the relevant cybercrime and hacking studies using six key 
influencing factors. In reviewing these studies, the key differentiations of cybercrimes 
from conventional crimes are contrasted along these six factors. Table 1 summarizes 
the six factors, their key features, how they influence cybercrimes, their impacts on the 
equilibrium crime level and return, and the examples drawn from the relevant studies. 
Understanding hacking behaviors not only increases our knowledge about information 
security. It also helps us devise effective ways to curb cybercrimes. Existing studies on 
hacking behaviors are scarce and scattered (Mahmood et al. 2010), yet a message is 
clear from this essay: the classical economic theory of crime can help analyze many 
new features of cybercrimes. The contribution of this essay is to systematically 
investigate these new features and, accordingly, how the classical theory applies. We 
hope this review provides a useful framework for researchers and practitioners to 
understand hacking behaviors via an economic perspective.
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Table 1. Summary of results 
Influencing factor Influence 
channel 
Key differentiation Impacts on equilibrium Example 
Law enforcement 
Supply 
curve 
Enforcement difficulty: the law 
cannot be enforced effectively in the 
cyberspace. Hackers can often 
strategically escape from punishment 
Tends to shift the supply curve rightward, leading 
to higher equilibrium quantity of cybercrimes but 
lower crime returns. 
 
US CAN-SPAM Act (e.g., Lee 2005, 
Grimes 2007),  
Hacking benefits Non-financial incentives: Many 
hackers are motivated by non-
financial incentives (e.g., they seek 
psychological or other non-monetary 
gains) 
Tends to shift the supply curve rightward, leading 
to higher equilibrium quantity of cybercrimes but 
lower crime returns. 
Hackers motivated by variety 
seeking (Ooi et al. 2002); Fame-
driven hackers (Leeson and Coyne 
2005) 
Hacking costs Economies of scale: mass cyber-
attacks exhibit high economies of 
scale  
Economies of scale would shift the supply curve 
rightward (cf. diseconomies of scale), leading to 
a higher equilibrium quantity of cybercrimes but 
lower crime returns. 
Economies of scale vs. 
diseconomies of scale in cyber-
attacks (Png and Wang 2009) 
Legal alternatives White collar crime: Hackings is often 
commissioned by educated, “white-
collar” workers 
Increasing the attractiveness of white collar jobs 
or IT jobs shifts the supply curve more than 
marginal jobs or non-IT jobs, which tends to 
decrease the equilibrium quantity of 
cybercrimes. 
Unemployment and cybercrimes 
(Png et al. 2008) 
Private defense 
Demand 
curve 
Inefficiencies: Spillover, misaligned 
incentives, and information 
asymmetry in private defense 
Inefficiencies can shift the demand curve to 
either the left or right, which could lead to either 
too much or too little cybercrimes when 
compared with the social optimum. 
Positive spillover vs. negative 
spillover effects (Varian 2004; 
Grossklags et al. 2008) 
Dual use problem  
Both 
Dual use: policy choice is ambiguous 
when a technology faces the “dual 
use” problem 
Affects both supply and demand. The net impact 
on cybercrimes is an empirical question. 
Vulnerability disclosure (Arora et al. 
2006, Mitra and Ransbotham 2015, 
Ransbotham et al. 2012); hacking 
discussion (Yue et al. 2019) 
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